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THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT:
WILL HIS VIEWS STILL MAKE NEWS?
Does the first amendment freedom of speech and press guarantee
to newsmen a testimonial privilege to refuse to appear or to testify be-
fore state or federal grand juries as to information gained through a
relationship with confidential sources? This was the question posed to
the United States Supreme Court by a trilogy of cases arising from the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,' the Court of Ap-
peals of Kentucky,2 and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.3
The Ninth Circuit had reversed in part a decision of the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California,4 and held that a
New York Times reporter covering the Black Panthers had such a priv-
ilege. The court went beyond the lower court's decision which merely
restricted the questions asked of the reporter while requiring appear-
ance. It determined that, absent the government showing of compelling
reasons to the contrary, a reporter need not jeopardize the confidence
of his sources by appearing before a closed-door grand jury session. In
contrast, the highest state courts of Kentucky and Massachusetts, con-
sidering respective motions by a newspaper reporter and a TV newsman
to quash state grand jury subpoenas, found that any "confidential in-
formant" privilege was so limited that it was outweighed by the right
of the public to "every man's evidence." 5 On writ of certiorari, the United
States Supreme Court, in a five-four decision, held: Requiring newsmen
to appear and testify before state or federal grand juries does not abridge
the freedom of speech and press guaranteed by the first amendment, re-
gardless of whether the flow of news from confidential sources is dis-
couraged by such a requirement. Branzburg v. Hayes, 92 S. Ct. 2646
(1972).6
1. Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 402 U.S. 942
(1971).
2. Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1970), cert. granted sub nom. Branzburg
v. Hayes, 402 U.S. 942 (1971).
3. In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297, cert. granted, 402 U.S. 942 (1971).
4. Application of Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
5. In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297, 299 (1971); accord, Branzburg v.
Found, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1970).
6. The three cases were decided in one opinion, with a separate dissent in the Caldwell
case. Petitioner Branzburg, a staff reporter for a daily newspaper in Louisville, Kentucky,
had refused to testify with respect to the identities of two men who had confided in him
concerning their illegal activities producing and selling hashish. Branzburg had actually pub-
lished a picture of the activity, and despite section 421.100 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes(1969), granting him a newsman's testimonial privilege against revealing sources, he was
ordered to testify as to any criminal acts he had actually observed. Petitioner Pappas, a
newsman-photographer for a New Bedford, Massachusetts, television station, had been
subpoenaed to testify as to his knowledge of Black Panther activities. Each of the newsmen
had asserted first amendment testimonial privileges against divulging his sources, Caldwell
also asserting a claimed privilege not even to appear before the grand jury, since the Pan-
thers would never know how much or how little he had said if he did appear.
CASES NOTED
As the majority reasoned, 7 the "heart" of the newsmen's claim was
that the infringement on the right of the press to gather news was so
great that it outweighed the interest of the public in obtaining the testi-
mony of newsmen subpoenaed before a grand jury." This assertion, in
essence, asked the Court to recognize an exception to the common law
rule that the public has a right to every man's evidence, including that
of journalists.' The newsmen nevertheless maintained that the privilege
they sought was implicit within the "freedom of press" clause of the first
amendment to the Constitution. 0
The argument that the first amendment exempted information ob-
tained in confidence by the news media from public disclosure was first
advanced in 1958 in the case of Garland v. Torre."' There it was held
that any first amendment testimonial privilege was not absolute and
should yield to the "fair administration of justice" when the information
sought went to the "heart of the claim" stated. In cases decided since
Garland, several courts, accepting the idea of a limited or "qualified"
testimonial privilege,'12 have suggested other tests for balancing the pub-
lic's right to evidence against the first amendment protection of the free
flow of news.'" Among these tests is the "compelling state interest" test
7. In addition to the majority opinion by Mr. Justice White, there was a concurring
opinion by Mr. Justice Powell, a dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Stewart, in which Jus-
tices Brennan and Marshall joined, and a separate dissent by Mr. Justice Douglas.
8. 92 S. Ct. at 2656. The Court summarized the reporters' argument that a burden is
placed on news gathering thusly:
[T]o gather news it is often necessary to agree either [11 not to identify the source
of information published or [2] to publish only part of the facts revealed, or [3]
both; . . . if the reporter is nevertheless forced to reveal these confidences to a
grand jury, the source so identified and other confidential sources of other reporters
will be measurably deterred from furnishing publishable information, all to the
detriment of the free flow of information protected by the First Amendment.
Id. at 2655 (numbering added).
9. Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 591, 596 (1966); e.g., Clein v. State, 52 So.2d 117 (Fla. 1950)
(affirming contempt conviction of a newspaper editor who refused to testify). But cf.
Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investig. Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963) (as to abuse of discre-
tion in legislative investigation).
10. In addition to the argued exception which relied on the first amendment to the
Constitution, petitioner Branzburg argued a privilege based on sections 1, 2, and 8 of the
Kentucky Constitution and on Ky. REv. STAT. § 421.100 (1969). The Court of Appeals of
Kentucky ignored the state constitutional argument entirely and construed the statute nar-
rowly to exempt the newsman from divulging the names of informants, but not the names
of individuals whom he personally had observed in the commission of a crime. Branzburg
v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1970). Therefore, since neither the Massachusetts legislature
nor the United States Congress had acted, and since the highest court of Kentucky con-
strued its statute so narrowly, all three newsmen's hopes stood solely on first amendment
grounds.
11. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958) (a civil suit).
12. The logic behind the first amendment privilege argument has been reduced to three
points: (a) Freedom of the press implies the right to gather news; (b) the right to gather
news implies the right to protect news sources; and (c) the right to protect news sources
must be broad and subject only to clear exceptions [for "confidential sources" to retain
"confidence"]. Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The Constitutional Right to a Confi-
dential Relationship, 80 YALP L.J. 317, 325-38 (1970).
13. Id. at 319-25 discusses several proposed tests.
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accepted by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Caldwell v.
United States,14 reversed by the Supreme Court in the decision herein
noted.'"
The Caldwell test, to which three members of the Court would have
subscribed, claimed a first amendment privilege against grand jury inter-
rogation, qualified in that the privilege would be lost when a grand jury
proved sufficient grounds for believing
[1] that the reporter possesses information relevant to a crime
the grand jury is investigating, [2] that the information the
reporter has is unavailable from other sources, and [3] that
the need for the information is sufficiently compelling to over-
ride the claimed invasion of First Amendment interests occa-
sioned by the disclosure.'0
The Caldwell test is consistent with a long line of cases which re-
quire that any official action with an adverse impact on first amendment
rights be justified by a public interest that is "compelling" or "para-
mount."' 7 However, the majority of the Supreme Court refused to ac-
knowledge that any "right" had been abridged. 8 While recognizing that
news gathering did qualify for first amendment protection, the majority
circumscribed in negative terms the scope of the protection offered. Dis-
tinguishing the cases before the Court from any in which first amend-
ment abuse had previously been recognized, the majority listed seven
elements which were not, in its view, factors in the instant cases, but
which presumably would have raised a "first amendment question":
[T]his case involves [1] no intrusions upon speech or assem-
bly, [2] no prior restraint or restriction on what the press may
publish, and [3] no express or implied command that the press
publish what it prefers to withhold. [4] No exaction or tax for
the privilege of publishing, and [5] no penalty, civil or crim-
inal, related to the content of published material is at issue
here. [6] The use of confidential sources by the press is not
forbidden or restricted; reporters remain free to seek news from
any source by means within the law. [7] No attempt is made
14. 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970).
15. According to the Court's summary of their claims, all three newsmen subscribed to
the same test. 92 S. Ct. at 2655.
16. Id. (numbering added).
17. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 439 (1963); accord, DeGregory v. Attorney
General of New Hampshire, 383 U.S. 825, 829 (1966); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516,
524 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 464 (1958); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 530 (1945); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
18. But cf. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investig. Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963):
[IUt is an essential prerequisite to the validity of an investigation which intrudes
into the area of constitutionally protected rights of speech, press, association and
petition that the State convincingly show a substantial relation between the in-
formation sought and a subject of overriding and compelling state interest.
Accord, Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U.S. 234 (1957).
CASES NOTED
to require the press to publish its sources of information or
indiscriminately to. disclose them on request 9
In delineating the possible fact patterns under which it might have
found a first amendment privilege, the Court in effect held that newsmen
have no privilege at all to withhold information merely because its dis-
closure might jeopardize their relationships with confidential sources.
Although the Court went to great lengths to point out that the three cases
before it would have been decided no differently even had it accepted
the "compelling interest" doctrine,2" the majority clearly desired to do
more than merely decide the instant cases on their respective facts. The
purpose seemed negative, however, rather than positive-the Court ex-
pressed great reluctance toward any "far-reaching interpretation of the
First Amendment fastening a nationwide rule on courts, grand juries, and
prosecuting officials everywhere."'21 In short, the Court declined to place
on the government the burden of proving that the testimony would be
relevant, critical, and otherwise unobtainable in every instance in which
a grand jury sought to obtain a newman's testimony.
In seeking to avoid the addition of such a procedural burden to the
administration of grand jury investigations, the Court had one option
which, with the exception of Mr. Justice Douglas, it declined to consider
-the idea that newsmen might have an absolute privilege not to appear
before grand juries. This, the majority hinted, would have been the only
certain solution to the problem of the deterrence of confidential informers,
since even a "qualified privilege" would leave a degree of uncertainty as
to whether the informer's name or other information might have to be
disclosed by a newsman. 2
Rejecting the possibility that journalists might have an absolute
privilege under the first amendment, the majority went on to cite numer-
ous collateral reasons for its decision against allowing even a qualified
privilege. In addition to the possibility of an increased procedural burden,
the Court noted that, historically, the press has been limited to the con-
stitutional rights of other citizens. The press has not been free from ob-
ligations to obey the law, nor privileged to publish without regard to the
rights of others, nor guaranteed the right to information not available to
the general public.23
19. 92 S. Ct. at 2556 (numbering and emphasis added).
20. Id. at 2666.
21. Id. at 2665.
22. If newsmen's confidential sources are as sensitive as they are claimed to be,
the prospect of being unmasked whenever a judge determines the situation justifies
it is hardly a satisfactory solution to the problem. For them, it would appear that
only an absolute privilege would suffice.
Id. at 2667-68 (footnote omitted). See Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The Consti-
tutional Right to a Confidential Relationship, 80 YALE L.J. 317, 345-58 (1970).
23. See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965) (not free to travel to Cuba
even though restriction of "free flow of information" resulted); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (not free to publish libel); Associated Press v. NLRB,
301 U.S. 103 (1937) (not exempt from National Labor Relations Act).
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In contrast to its refusal to allow the press any special legal status,
the Court emphasized the, status and role of the grand jury in both state
and federal prosecutions. The provision of the fifth amendment to the
Constitution requiring a grand jury presentment or indictment in the case
of all "capital, or otherwise infamous crime [s]," as well as the need for
the grand jury to have broad investigative powers to perform this re-
quired role, were considered paramount. 24 The grand jury is "not to be
limited narrowly by questions of propriety or forecasts of the probable
result of the investigation ....
Consistent with the viewpoint of a more conservative court, the
majority declined to add to the common law a testimonial privilege other
than that already rooted in the fifth amendment-the privilege against
self-incrimination. Conceding that to do so lay within the prerogative
of Congress and the state legislatures, it took judicial notice of the fact
that neither the majority of states nor the Congress had chosen to create
such an exception.2
As further justification for its holding, the Court cited the uncer-
tainty of the deterrent effect on the flow of news,27 the fact that the press
has always flourished without the privilege, and the power of the press
to protect itself (presumably by influencing public opinion and thereby
the legislative branch of government). Additionally, it was asserted that
the deterrence of future crimes by effective prosecution of persons pres-
ently suspected of offenses outweighs the speculative loss of future news
about crimes from undisclosed sources. As the Court stated, "[a] gree-
ments to conceal information relevant to commission of crime have very
little to recommend them from the standpoint of public policy."28
24. In addition to the federal requirement imposed by the Constitution, there are
thirty-two states which require that certain kinds of criminal prosecutions be initiated by
indictment, and eighteen states which use the grand jury as an investigative tool when
they proceed by information. Spain, The Grand Jury, Past and Present: A Survey, 2
Am. CRm. L.Q. 119, 126-42 (1964).
25. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919).
26. Seventeen states, including Kentucky [Ky REV. STAT. § 421.100 (1969)] have done
so. Kentucky's statute has been narrowly construed. See note 10 supra. For an analysis of
proposed Congressional legislation, see STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH
CoNG., 2D SEss., THE N.wsmAN's PRIVILEGE (Comm. Print 1966).
27. But see McCray v. Illionis, 386 U.S. 300 (1967), and Scher v. United States, 305
U.S. 251 (1938), which, in the words of Mr. Justice Douglas, hold that
prosecutors need not disclose informers' names because disclosure would (a) termi-
nate the usefulness of an exposed informant inasmuch as others would no longer
confide in him, and (b) it would generally inhibit persons from becoming con-
fidential informers.
United States v. Caldwell, 92 S. Ct. 2686, 2693 n.11 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
28. 92 S. Ct. at 2663.
Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a
court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known
the same to some judge or other person in civil or military authority under the
United States, shall be [guilty of misprison].
18 U.S.C. § 4 (1970). Case law, however, has held that some affirmative act of concealment
or participation is also required. Bratton v. United States, 73 F.2d 795 (10th Cir. 1934).
Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent indicated that he felt it was unfortunate that this case
ever arose. This writer feels that it is a sad commentary on Americans and American
CASES NOTED
The Court also speculated that the bulk of confidential relationships
should not be threatened by the fact that a few might be opened to grand
jury scrutiny. First, it was noted that most news sources are not them-
selves engaged in criminal activity. Second, a reporter may never be
called to testify. Third, the symbiotic relationship of many minority and
dissident group "informants" with the press will necessitate that the
former continue to utilize their press link to air their views. Finally, the
Court rationalized that persons who would fear for their job security
would have no more fear of a secretive grand jury knowing their testi-
mony than of the press having similar knowledge.29 Since much of the
Court's reasoning was based on speculation, there was considerable dis-
agreement with, and rebuttal of, the majority opinion in the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart, in which Justices Brennan and Marshall
joined.80
Despite the considerable effort devoted to posing a wide variety of
arguments which varied in scope from legal philosophy to group psy-
chology, it appears to this writer that the decision of the Court truly
hinged on certain practical considerations. These considerations become
apparent from the Court's logic, which may be summarized thusly: (1)
Reporters claim a privilege which is conditional, not absolute. (2) The
suggested condition precedent to subjecting them to a grand jury sub-
poena would require a grand jury to prove, a fortiori, probable cause
that a particular crime has been committed by a particular person, that
it is of a serious or "compelling" nature, and that the reporter possesses
relevant information not otherwise available to the grand jury. (3) This
suggestion, heretofore denominated as the "compelling interest test," is
unacceptable for three reasons: First, one of the functions of the grand
djury is to determine whether or not probable cause for an indictment
exists. Paradoxically, the suggested test would require the grand jury
to prove the existence of probable cause prior to calling for the testimony
society that freedom of expression is so stifled either "officially" or "unofficially" (by the
legal system or simply by "moral suasion") that a man need fear to expose his views and
admit that they are his own, or to volunteer his observations of fact when they might
lead to the correction of a public wrong. Of course, neither the press nor the legal au-
thorities would like to do without their "stool pigeons"; both use them in the name of the
public good. Yet, while the majority noted the tainted nature of information so derived
and questioned its credibility, the dissent pointed to the unfortunate consequence that
without it much corruption might never be unearthed.
29. But cf. United States v. Caldwell, 92 S. Ct. 2686, 2693 n.12 (1972) (dissenting
opinion) (examples of school teacher, Air Force employee, and F.B.I. agent fired after
testifying as to unpopular practices, as well as an F.B.I. investigation of a television com-
mentator who criticized the administration).
30. United States v. Caldwell, 92 S. Ct. 2646, 2671-86 (dissenting opinion). Both the
majority and the dissent actually distinguished between two types of informant: the "spy,"
who has done nothing criminally wrong himself, but who has knowledge relevant to
criminal activity as defined by current laws, and the "criminal," who is such because his
personal views, and perhaps actions, run contrary to such laws. These two "types"
clearly have different motives for fearing exposure. Consequently, arguments were made
concerning the possible effect of the Court's decision on both species of informant.
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of a reporter expected to aid them in determining whether probable cause
existed. Second, such a requirement, were it reasonable, would necessitate
that, for every reporter subpoenaed, a judge not only decide whether the
proper predicate of probable cause and relevancy had been laid, but also
make a value judgment as to the relative weight of the public interest in
prosecuting a particular statutory crime. Such a decision, said the Court,
properly belongs in the hands of the legislative branch and should not
be added to the burden of the judiciary. Finally, even if the compelling
interest test were not otherwise impracticable, its institution would prob-
ably fail to achieve the desired first amendment result of promoting the
free flow of news, in that once certain crimes had been judicially desig-
nated as serious enough to create the "compelling" public interest, a gen-
eralized deterrent would be created toward any informant whose in-
formation related to such crimes."'
(4) The Court also suggested that if, as alleged by the news media,8 2
the "leads" given by news stories made possible by confidential inform-
ants would be more valuable to law enforcement than the grand jury
subpoena power over the newsmen would be, the law enforcers would
recognize this and cease to subpoena them. It was noted that the Attorney
General of the United States had already fashioned a set of rules for fed-
eral officials in connection with subpoenaing members of the press to
testify before grand juries or at criminal trials.88
While the Court refused to find any abuse of judicial discretion in
the cases before it,"* it explicitly stated that "grand jury investigations
if instituted or conducted other than in good faith, would pose wholly
different issues for resolution under the First Amendment." 8 As an
31. See note 22 supra.
32. Amicus curiae briefs and affidavits were filed by such news agencies as The New
York Times and by such newsmen as Walter Cronkite (Cronkite's affidavit was filed in
Caldwell at the district court level).
33. Guidelines for Subpoenas to the News Media, Dept. Justice Memo. No. 692 (Sept.
2, 1970). The guidelines provide for criteria similar to the "compelling interest test" to be
met, and, with limited exceptions, provide that the Attorney General himself must
expressly authorize such subpoenas.
34. [Ilt is quite apparent (1) that the State has the necessary interest in extirpat-
ing the traffic in illegal drugs, in forestalling assassination attempts on the Presi-
dent, and in preventing the community from being disrupted by violent disorders
endangering both persons and property; and (2) that, based on the stories
Branzburg and Caldwell wrote and Pappas' admitted conduct, the grand jury
called these reporters as they would others-because it was likely that they could
supply information to help the Government determine whether illegal conduct
had occurred and, if it had, whether there was sufficient evidence to return an
indictment.
92 S. Ct. at 2666. But cf. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 251 (1957):
The State Supreme Court itself recognized that there was a weakness in its con-
clusion that the menace of forcible overthrow of the government justified sacrificing
constitutional rights. There was a missing link in the chain. . . .The syllogism was
not complete. There was nothing to connect the questioning of petitioner with this
fundamental interest of the State.
35. 92 S. Ct. at 2669.
CASES NOTED
example, the Court cited Younger v. Harris,36 where the Court distin-
guished between incidental and direct infringements upon constitutional
rights in determining when a petitioner might be entitled to injunctive
relief against state action.
The Harris Court3 7 limited the prior decision of Dombrowski v.
Pfister,38 in which "overbreadth" of a state statute affecting first amend-
ment rights was held to be cause for federal injunctive relief. In Harris,
it was opined that there may nevertheless be "extraordinary circum-
stances in which [an] .. .irreparable injury can be shown even in the
absence of the usual prerequisites of bad faith and harassment"3 such
that injunctive relief might be granted. Even there, however, the Court
declined to specify further what circumstances would fit its definition.
The Branzburg decision, while likewise failing to speculate, kept the
door open and stated that any burdening of the press without a law
enforcement purpose would subject subpoenas of newsmen to a motion
to quash. As interpreted by Mr. Justice Powell in his concurring opinion,
the result of the Court's holding should be a judgment of each claim
of privilege "on its facts," balancing first amendment rights and societal
interests in law enforcement "on a case-by-case basis."4°
In a footnote to his opinion, Mr. Justice Powell stated that the
majority view frees the judiciary to balance fairly the freedom of the
press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony. On
the other hand, he revealed his feeling that
[t]he new constitutional rule endorsed by the dissenting opin-
ion would, as a practical matter, defeat such a fair balancing
and the essential societal interest in the detection and prosecu-
tion of crime would be heavily subordinated.4
This would be the result, it was impliedly argued, since a reporter would
be-allowed to "litigate at the threshold the State's very authority to sub-
poena him." 42
As previously stated, the majority ultimately decided that the bur-
den of proof in a controversy over whether a reporter must testify before
a grand jury remains on the reporter to support his motion to quash a
subpoena. The Court refused to shift to the government the burden of
proof by requiring that it meet requirements such as those asserted in
the proposed test. The majority indicated that the prosecution should
not have to prove, nor should a judge have to determine, that the enforce-
ment of a given law has any more "compelling interest" than the enforce-
36. 401 U.S. 37, 49, 53-54 (1971).
37. Id. at 53.
38. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
39. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971).
40. 92 S. Ct. at 2671.
41. Id. at 2671 (concurring opinion).
42. Id.
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ment of any other, in order to justify requiring a newsman to testify
before a grand jury.4"
The majority placed its hope in the proposition that law enforce-
ment agencies, in their own interest, will police themselves, or in the
alternative, that such a "hue and cry" will be raised that Congress and
the state legislatures will take remedial action. In this regard, the ma-
jority's point is well taken that of all "interest groups," the news media
are among the least defenseless. If anything will result in the awakening
of the power of the press against blind sponsorship of "law and order"
at the expense of constitutional rights, perhaps this decision will. And
perhaps the fear alone of such an awakening will deter the government
from any outlandish abuses of discretion. Meanwhile, if reporters seek
their' protection in the courtroom, they must be prepared to offer positive
proof that the government's grand jury is on a mere "fishing expedition,"
or that in some other way one of the seven enumerated offenses 44 violat-
ing the freedom of press is occurring.
The question unresolved by Branzburg, which leaves the criteria for
freedom of the press somewhat uncertain, is whether trial and appellate
courts will truly take such applications for judicial protection on a case-
by-case basis, or whether, in avoiding a solid shield of protection for all
confidential relationships, the Supreme Court has left the news media in
the exposed and unprotected position feared by the dissent.45
DOUGLAS K. SILVIS
DISCRIMINATORY JURY SELECTION: REVERSIBLE ERROR
REGARDLESS OF DEFENDANT'S OWN RACE
Petitioner, a white male, was indicted and convicted for burglary.'
No member of either the grand jury which indicted him or the petit jury
which convicted him was black. In a petition for federal habeas corpus
relief, he raised the claim that discriminatory jury selection practices
were used and that blacks were thereby systematically excluded from
these bodies.2 On the basis of this exclusion, the petitioner claimed that
43. Branzburg v. Hayes, 92 S. Ct. 2646 (1972).
44. See note 19, supra, and accompanying text.
45. The dissent, per Mr. Justice Stewart, expressed the fear that "[tihe court...
invites state and federal authorities to undermine the historic independence of the press by
attempting to annex the journalistic profession as an investigative arm of government." 92
S. Ct. at 2671.
1. This action has a long and involved history. Petitioner was tried twice for this
offense. The first trial resulted in a conviction that was reversed on appeal on fourth
amendment grounds. Peters v. State, 114 Ga. App. 595, 115 S.E.2d 647 (1966). On retrial,
petitioner was again found guilty. This conviction was affirmed on appeal. Peters v. State,
115 Ga. App. 743, 156 S.E.2d 195 (1967).
2. A previous petition was denied for failure to exhaust then-available state remedies.
Peters v. Rutledge, 397 F.2d 731 (5th Cir. 1968).
